Philosophy homework help. Games People Play Colgate and Unilever are engaged in an innovation R&D competition (game). Each firm knows the structure of the game, including both its own and the other firms payoffs from the various outcomes of this game. (This is a classic business dilemma though a bit different from the Intel vs AMD problem we discussed.) In the final stage of this R&D game, Colgate has up to three possible innovation R&D strategies: Broad, Narrow, or Mixed. Unilever has two possible innovation R&D strategies: Complex or Disruptive. When the firms get to this final stage of the R&D game (in which each chooses one of its possible innovation strategies), the game will be a simultaneous one round game. For this R&D game=, if there are all possible strategies and no side payments, the payoffs for each possible outcome are: Colgate UnileverColgate Broad, Unilever Complex 46 36Colgate Broad, Unilever Disruptive 34 47Colgate Narrow, Unilever Complex 45 44Colgate Narrow, Unilever Disruptive 37 48Colgate Mixed, Unilever Complex 49 35Colgate Mixed, Unilever Disruptive 41 43The R&D game is played in several steps, however. 1. First, if Colgate wants to, Colgate has the ability to make an irrevocable and fully binding commitment for Colgate to make a side payment of 10 to Unilever, if and only if Unilever chooses the strategy Complex when Unilever makes a strategy choice in the game shown above. If Colgate decides to commit to the side payment, Unilever knows that it will receive the side payment of 10 if it chooses Complex. (The side payment will be settled at the same time as the payoffs are made at the end of the R&D game.) Colgate must decide whether or not to commit to making this side payment.2. After Colgate announces whether or not it will commit to the side payment offer, Unilever then has the ability, if it wants to, to remove the strategy choice Mixed from the set of possible R&D strategies that Colgate could choose. Unilever must decide whether or not to prevent Colgate from being able to choose Mixed.3. Once those two decisions are made by the firms, the game of selecting innovation R&D strategies is then played, using any rules from those two decisions in addition to the rules simultaneous, non-cooperative, one-shot. For this game, if the game has one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, then we expect each firm will then select its Nash-equilibrium strategy. If the game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies – or if the game has two or more Nash equilibriums in pure strategies – then the game will actually not be played. Instead, each company will receive a payoff of 40 in lieu of playing the game. (And, if the game is not actually played, then there will be no side payment.)Here are these questions for you to answer for this R&D game: (a) Should Colgate commit to making the side payment if and only if Unilever chooses Complex, or should Colgate not offer a side payment?(b) Should Unilever remove the strategy Mixed from Colgates possible strategies, or should Unilever allow Colgate to consider and potentially choose the strategy Mixed? (c) What is the outcome of the overall R&D game? Offer a full explanation of why you reach your conclusions. In your answer, please be as precise as possible; show enough in your answer to show how you are solving for various aspects of the game.
Our Company
-
- eliteesayhub will be listed as ‘Writing Help’ on your bank statement.